The paper provides an analysis of the voting method known as delegable proxy voting, or liquid democracy. The analysis first positions liquid democracy within the theory of binary aggregation. It then focuses on two issues of the system: the occurrence of delegation cycles; and the effect of delegations on individual rationality when voting on logically interdependent propositions. It finally points to proposals on how the system may be modified in order to address the above issues.
Introduction
Liquid democracy [3] is a form of group decision-making considered to lie between direct and representative democracy. It has been used and popularized by campaigns for democratic reforms (e.g., Make Your Laws 1 in the US) and parties (e.g., Demoex 2 in Sweden, and Piratenpartei 3 in Germany), which used it to coordinate the behavior of party representatives in local as well as national assemblies. At its heart is voting via a delegable proxy, also called transferable or transitive proxy. For each issue submitted to vote, each agent can either cast its own vote, or it can delegate its vote to another agent-a proxy-and that agent can delegate in turn to yet another agent, and so on. This differentiates liquid democracy from standard proxy voting [20, 23] , where proxies cannot delegate their vote further. Finally, the agents that decided not to delegate their votes cast their ballots (e.g., under majority rule), but their votes now carry a weight consisting of the number of all agents that, directly or indirectly, entrusted them with their vote.
Context Voting by delegable proxy was most probably first outlined in [10] . Analyses of standard (non-delegable) proxy voting from a social choice-theoretic perspective-specifically through the theory of spatial voting-have been put forth in [1] and [14] . To date, little work has focused directly on liquid democracy: [17] provided an empirical study of voting behavior in liquid democracy based on election data from the Liquid Feedback 4 platform of the German Piratenpartei; and [22] studied how, in the Liquid Feedback platform, issues to be submitted to vote are selected among user-generated proposals via proportional rankings. 5 However, to the best of our knowledge, no work has so far studied voting by delegable proxy as an aggregation rule in its own sake. We do this in the present paper, studying liquid democracy from the perspective of binary aggregation [11, 13, 15, 12] .
Outline The paper starts in Section 2 by introducing some preliminaries on the theory of binary aggregation. This preliminary section presents also novel results on binary aggregation with abstentions, which are needed for the analysis developed later in the paper. Section 3 introduces a simple model of liquid democracy based on binary aggregation. Section 4 establishes formal relations between the proposed model of liquid democracy and standard binary aggregation with abstentions. It studies the issue of circular delegations, and the issue of individual (ir)rationality when voting takes place on logically interdependent issues. The section finally moves from the analysis provided to outline two variants of delegable proxy, which: are more resilient against delegation cycles (Section 4.3); better preserve individual rationality when voting on logically interdependent issues (Section 4.4). Section 5 concludes.
Binary Aggregation
The formalism of choice for the analysis presented in this paper is binary aggregation with abstentions (see, for instance, [11] ). This section is devoted to its introduction.
Opinions and Opinion Profiles
A binary aggregation structure (BA structure) is a tuple A = N, P, γ where:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a non-empty finite set individuals (|N| = n);
• P = {p 1 , . . . , p m } is a non-empty finite set of issues or propositions (|P| = m);
• γ ∈ L is an (integrity) constraint, where L is the propositional language constructed by closing P under a functionally complete set of Boolean connectives (e.g., {¬, ∧}).
A binary opinion is an assignment of acceptance/rejection values (or, truth values) to the set of issues P. Allowing abstention amounts to considering incomplete opinions: an incomplete opinion is a partial function from P to {0, 1}. We will study it as a function O : P → {0, 1, * } thereby explicitly denoting the undetermined value " * " corresponding to abstention. Thus, O(p) = 0 (respectively, O(p) = 1) indicates that opinion O rejects (respectively, accepts) the issue p. Syntactically, the two opinions correspond to the truth of the literals p or ¬p. For p ∈ P we write ±p to denote one element from {p, ¬p}, and ±P to denote p∈P {p, ¬p}, which we will refer to as the agenda of A . We say that the incomplete opinion of an agent i is consistent if the set of formulas {p | O i (p) = 1} ∪ {¬p | O i (p) = 0} ∪ {γ} can be extended to a model of γ (in other words, if the set is satisfiable). Intuitively, the consistency of an incomplete opinion means that the integrity constraint is consistent with i's opinion on the issues she does not abstain about. We also say that an incomplete opinion is closed whenever the following is the case: if the set of propositional formulas {p
. That is, individual opinions are closed under logical consequence or, in other words, agents cannot abstain on issues whose acceptance or rejection is dictated by their expressed opinions on other issues. The set of incomplete opinions is denoted O * and the set of consistent and closed incomplete opinions O * c . We will often refer to the latter simply as individual opinions, as they are the ones we focus on.
An opinion profile O = (O 1 , . . . , O n ) records the opinion on the elements of P, of every individual in N. Given a profile O the i th projection O is denoted O i (i.e., the opinion of agent i in profile O). We also denote by O(p) = {i ∈ N | O i (p) = 1} the set of agents accepting issue p in profile O, by O(¬p) = {i ∈ N | O i (p) = 0} the set of agents rejecting p in O, and by O(±p) = O(p) ∪ O(¬p) the set of nonabstaining agents in O. Sometimes we restrict the previous definitions to a coalition C ⊆ N, so that O C (p) (resp., O C (¬p)) denotes the set of agents in C that accept (resp., reject) p. Finally, we write O = −i O ′ to denote that the two profiles O and O ′ are identical except, possibly, for the opinion of voter i.
Aggregators
An aggregator is a function F : (O * c ) N → O * , from profiles of closed and consistent incomplete opinions to incomplete opinions. The issue-by-issue strict majority rule (maj) accepts an issue if and only if the majority of the non-abstaining voters accept that issue:
We will refer to this rule simply as 'majority'. Majority can be thought of as a quota rule. Quota rules in binary aggregation with abstentions are of the following form: accept when the proportion of non-abstaining individuals who accept is above the acceptance-quota; reject when the proportion of non-abstaining individuals who reject is above the rejection-quota; and abstain otherwise: 6 Definition 1 (Quota rules). Let A be a BA structure. A quota rule (for A ) is defined as follows, for any issue p ∈ P, and any opinion profile O ∈ (O * c ) N :
where ⌈·⌉ is the cealing function. And, for x ∈ {0, 1}, q x is a function q x : P → (0, 1] ∩ Q assigning a positive rational number smaller or equal to 1 to each issue, and such that, for each p ∈ P:
A quota rule is called:
Notice that the definition excludes trivial quota. 7 It should also be clear that, by the constraint in (3), Definition 1 defines an aggregator of type (O * c ) N → O * as desired. 8 Notice finally that if the rule is symmetric, then (3) forces q x (p) > 1 2 , for any given p. 6 There are several ways to think of quota rules with abstentions. Instead of a quota being a proportion of non-abstaining agents, one could for instance define rules with absolute quotas instead: accept when at least n agents accept, independently of how many agents do not abstain. In practice, voting rules with abstention are often a combination of those two ideas: accept an issue if a big enough proportion of the population does not abstain, and if a big enough proportion of those accept it. 7 Those are quotas with value 0 (always met) or > 1 (never met). Restricting to non-trivial quota is not essential but simplifies our exposition. 8 What needs to be avoided here is that both the acceptance and rejection quota are set so low as to make the rule output both the acceptance and the rejection of the issue. We refer the reader to [15, Ch. 2] for a detailed exposition of the above rather technical conditions. We provide just a simple illustrative example here. We proceed by recalling some well-known properties of aggregators from the judgment and binary aggregation literatures, adapted to the setting of aggregation with abstention: 9 anonymous iff for any bijection µ : 
increasing support for a definite collective opinion does not change that collective opinion.
independent iff, for all p ∈ P, for any profiles
e., the collective opinion on each issue is determined only by the individual opinions on that issue.
neutral iff, for all p, q ∈ P, for any profile
I.e., all issues are aggregated in the same manner.
responsive iff for all p ∈ P, there exist profiles
I.e., the rule allows for an issue to be accepted for some profile, and rejected for some other.
unbiased iff for all p ∈ P, for any profiles
e., reversing all and only the individual opinions on p (from acceptance to rejection and from rejection to acceptance) results in reversing the collective opinion on p. rational iff for any profile O, F(O) is consistent and closed. I.e., the aggregator preserves the constraints on individual opinions.
Majority is unanimous, anonymous, monotonic, independent, neutral, responsive and unbiased, but it is not rational in general, as witnessed by well-known judgment aggregation paradoxes (cf. [15] ).
Finally, let us also define the following property. The undecisiveness of an aggregator F on issue p for a given aggregation structure is defined as the number of profiles which result in collective abstention on p, that is:
Some Results
Aggregation by majority is collectively rational under specific assumptions on the aggregation constraint: Proposition 1. Let A be a BA structure with a simple agenda. Then maj is rational.
May's theorem [19] famously shows that for preference aggregation, the majority rule is in fact the only aggregator satisfying a specific set of desirable properties. A corresponding characterization of the majority rule is given in standard judgment aggregation (without abstentions): when the agenda is simple, the majority rule is the only aggregator which is rational, anonymous, monotonic and unbiased [15, Th. 3.2] . We give below a novel characterization theorem, which takes into account the possibility of abstentions both at the individual and at the collective level. To the best of our knowledge this is the first result of this kind in the literature on judgment and binary aggregation with abstention.
We first prove the following lemma: Lemma 1. Let F be a uniform and symmetric quota rule for a given A . The following holds:
That is, the quota rule(s) corresponding to the majority rule (Example 1) is precisely the rule that minimizes undecisiveness.
We can now state and prove the characterization result:
an aggregator for a given A . The following holds: 1. F is a quota rule if and only if it is anonymous, independent, monotonic, and responsive; 2. F is a uniform quota rule if and only if it is a neutral quota rule;

F is a symmetric quota rule if and only if it is an unbiased quota rule;
F is the majority rule maj if and only if it is a uniform symmetric quota rule which minimizes undecisiveness.
By the above theorem and Proposition 1, it follows that, on simple agendas, majority is the only rational aggregator which is also responsive, anonymous, systematic and monotonic.
We conclude by recollecting a well-known impossibility result concerning binary aggregation with abstentions:
Theorem 2 ( [11, 9] 
Binary Liquid Democracy
In binary aggregation with delegable proxy, agents either express an acceptance/rejection opinion or delegate the expression of such an opinion to another agent. The section models and studies this type of voting as a form of binary aggregation function.
Proxy Opinions, Profiles and Delegation Graphs
Let a BA structure A be given and assume for now that γ = ⊤, that is, all issues are logically independent. An opinion O : P → {0, 1} ∪ N is an assignment of either a truth value or another agent to each issue in P, such that O i (p) = i (that is, self-delegation is not an expressible opinion). We will later also require proxy opinions to be individually rational, in a precise sense (Section 4.1). For simplicity we are assuming that abstention is not a feasible opinion in proxy voting, but such assumption can be easily lifted in what follows.
We call functions of the above kind proxy opinions to distinguish them from standard (binary) opinions, and we denote by P the set of all proxy opinions, P c the set of all individually rational proxy opinions (as defined later in Section 4.1). Finally, P N denotes the set of all profiles of proxy opinions, which we call, proxy profiles.
The expression iR p j stands for "i delegates her vote to j on issue p". Each R p is a so-called functional relation. It corresponds to the graph of an endomap on N. So we will sometimes refer to the endomap r p : N → N of which R p is the graph. Relations R p have a very specific structure and can be thought of as a set of (converging) trees whose roots all belong to cycles (possibly loops). The weight of an agent i w.r.t. p in a delegation graph G O is given by its indegree with respect to R * p (i.e., the reflexive and transitive closure of R p ): 10 
. This definition of weight makes sure that each individual carries the same weight, independently of the structure of the delegation graph. Alternative definitions of weight are of course possible. For all p ∈ P, we consider the function g p : N → ℘(N) defined as g p (i) = j ∈ N | iR * p j and jR p j . The function associates to each agent i (for a given issue p), the (singleton consisting of the) last agent reachable from i via a path of delegation on issue p, when it exists (and / 0 otherwise). Slightly abusing notation we will use g p (i) to denote an agent, that is, the guru of i over p when g p (i) = / 0. If g p (i) = {i} we call i a guru for p. Notice that g p (i) = {i} iff r p (i) = i, i.e., i is a guru of p iff it is a fixpoint of the endomap r p .
If the delegation graph G O of a proxy profile O is such that, for some R p , there exists no i ∈ N such that i is a guru of p, we say that graph G O (and profile O) is void on p. Intuitively, a void profile is a profile where no voter expresses an opinion, because every voter delegates her vote to somebody else.
Given a BA structure A , a proxy aggregation rule (or proxy aggregator) for A is a function pv : P N → O * that maps every proxy profile to one collective incomplete opinion. As above, pv(O)(p) denotes the outcome of the aggregation on issue p.
Proxy Aggregators
The most natural form of voting via delegable proxy is a proxy version of the majority rule we discussed in Section 2: 11
Again, the notation O(p) (resp., O(¬p)) denotes the set of voters accepting (resp., rejecting) p in proxy profile O. Intuitively, an issue is accepted by proxy majority in profile O if the sum of the weights of the agents who accept p in O exceeds the majority quota, it is rejected if the sum of the weights of the agents who reject p in O exceeds the majority quota, and it is undecided otherwise. Note that ∑ i∈O(p) w O i (p) = |{i ∈ N|O g i (p) = 1}| (and similarly for ¬p), that is, the sum of the weights of the gurus accepting (rejecting) p is precisely the cardinality of the set of agents whose gurus accept (reject) p.
It should be clear that for any quota rule F : O * c → O * a proxy variant pv F of F can be defined via an obvious adaptation of (6).
Analysis and Extensions
In this section we provide an analysis of liquid democracy by highlighting two issues-the failure of rationality in ballots under delegable proxy voting, and the occurrence of delegation cycles-and by embedding it in the theory of binary aggregation with abstentions presented in Section 2. We also advance proposals for simple modifications of the delegable proxy voting method in order to address the issues we identify.
Individual and Collective Rationality
In our discussion so far we have glossed over the issue of logically interdependent issues and collective rationality. The reason is that under the delegative interpretation of liquid democracy developed in the previous sections individual rationality itself appears to be a more debatable requirement than it normally is in classical aggregation.
A proxy opinion O i is individually rational if the set of formulas
is satisfiable (consistency), and if whenever (7) entails ±p, then ±p belongs to it (closure). That is, the integrity constraint γ is consistent with i's opinion on the issues she does not delegate on, and the opinions of her gurus (if they exist), and those opinions, taken together, are closed under logical consequence. The consistency and closure of (7) capture a highly idealized way of how delegation works: voters are assumed to be able to check or monitor how their gurus are going to vote, and always modify their delegations if an inconsistency arises. So the constraint appears highly unrealistic under a delegative interpretation of liquid democracy. Aggregation via delegable proxy has at least the potential to represent individual opinions as irrational (inconsistent and/or not logically closed).
The assumption of individual rationality for proxy opinions, however, is needed in order to establish variants of known binary aggregation results for the case of liquid democracy, to which we turn now.
Embedding
Having defined individual rationality in the previous section, it is possible now to study embeddings from proxy voting to standard aggregation, and vice versa.
Aggregation in liquid democracy-as conceived in [3] -should satisfy the principle that the opinion of every voter, whether expressed directly or through proxy, should be given the same weight. 12 In other words, this principle suggests that aggregation via delegable proxy should actually be 'blind' for the specific type of delegation graph arising. Making this more formal, we can think of the above principle as suggesting that the only relevant content of a proxy profile is its translation into a standard opinion profile (with abstentions) via a function t : P → O * defined as follows: for any i ∈ N and
, if i has a guru for p), and t(O i (p)) = * otherwise. Clearly, if we assume proxy profiles to be individually rational, the translation will map proxy opinions into individually rational (consistent and closed) incomplete opinions. By extension, we will denote by t(O) the incomplete opinion profile resulting from translating the individual opinions of a proxy profile O.
The above discussion suggests the definition of the following property of proxy aggregators: a proxy aggregator pv has the one man-one vote property (or is a one man-one vote aggregator) if and only if pv = t • F for some aggregator F : O * c → O * (assuming the individual rationality of proxy profiles). 13 The class of one man-one vote aggregators can therefore be studied simply as the concatenation t • F where F is an aggregator for binary voting with abstentions, as depicted in Figure 1 ( 13 Not every proxy aggregator satisfies the one man-one vote property. By means of example, consider an aggregator that uses the following notion of weight accrued by gurus in a delegation graph. The weight w(i) of i is ∑ j∈R * (i)
where ℓ(i, j) denotes the length of the delegation path linking j to i. This definition of weight is such that the contribution of voters decreases as their distance from the guru increases. Aggregators of this type are studied in [4] . Figure 1 : Embeddings to and from binary aggregation.
Example 4. Proxy majority pv maj (6) is a one man-one vote rule aggregator. It is easy to check that, for any proxy profile O: pv maj (O) = maj(t(O)).
It follows that for every proxy aggregator pv F = t •F the axiomatic machinery developed for standard aggregators can be directly tapped into. Characterization results then extend effortlessly. In particular, Theorem 1 implies the following: Fact 1 (Characterization of proxy majority). A one man-one vote proxy aggregator pv = t • F for a given A is proxy majority pv maj iff F is anonymous, independent, monotonic, responsive, neutral and minimizes undecisiveness.
The fact may well be considered as a theoretical argument in favor of the use of proxy majority in aggregation with delegable proxy as currently done, for instance, in the Liquid Feedback platform.
Similarly, we can study an embedding of standard aggregation into voting with delegable proxy. For example, we can define a function s : O * c → P c from opinion profiles to individually rational proxy profiles as follows. 
Cycles and Abstentions
Proxy aggregators rely on the existence of gurus in the underlying delegation graphs. If the delegation graph R p on issue p contains no guru, then the aggregator has access to no information in terms of who accepts and who rejects issue p. To avoid bias in favor of acceptance or rejection, such situations should therefore result in an undecided collective opinion. That is for instance the case of pv maj . However, such situations may well be considered problematic, and the natural question arises therefore of how likely they are, at least in principle. Proposition 2. Let A be a BA structure where γ = ⊤ (i.e., issues are independent) and fix an issue p.
If each proxy profile is equally probable (impartial culture assumption), then the probability that a given proxy profile O is such that t(O) is a profile in which every voter abstains tends to
1 e 2 as n tends to infinity.
14 Notice that since self-delegation (that is, O i (p) = i) is not feasible in proxy opinions, this definition of s works for profiles where, on each issue, either nobody abstains or at least two individuals abstain. Clearly, a dummy abstaining voter can then be added in profiles where only one individual abstains.
It follows that for unanimous and one man-one vote proxy aggregators, asymptotically, there is a considerable chance that a profile results in collective abstention. Now contrast this with the probability that all agents abstain on an issue when each voter either expresses a 1 or 0 opinion or abstains (that is, the binary aggregation with abstentions setting studied earlier). In that case the probability that everybody abstains, and therefore the profile is void, clearly tends to 0 as n tends to infinity.
Proposition 2 should obviously not be taken as a realistic estimate of the effect of cycles on collective abstention, moreover concrete implementations of delegable proxy voting may be designed to detect and resolve cycles (cf. [24, 17] ). Ultimately, theoretical (e.g., game theoretic) models of delegation behavior in voters or, ideally, election data should be used to assess whether delegation cycles ever lead large parts of the electorate to effectively lose representation in the aggregation mechanism. Still, the link we highlight between delegable proxy and collective abstention is, to the best of our knowledge, novel and has escaped so far recognition within the liquid democracy literature. 15 
Delegable Proxy with Default Values
Motivated by the above analysis, we outline a simple modification of voting via delegable proxy, which requires agents to always submit a substantive opinion on the issues, and at the same time indicate a trustee. In this view, an opinion (called proxy opinion with default) is therefore a function O i : P → ({0, 1} ×N) assigning to every issue an acceptance or rejection value and, at the same time, an individual, which is to be considered the individual the vote is delegated to. Intuitively, each voter expresses an opinion but accepts that opinion to be overruled by the opinion of the individual she entrusts. Note that such individual may well be the voter herself (e.g., O i (p) = (1, i) ). We refer to profiles of such opinions as proxy profiles with default.
|} denote the set of cycles of the delegation graph R p such that among the agents in the cycle there exists a majority accepting p. The set C O (¬p) is defined in the symmetric way. Now define proxy majority as an aggregator for profiles of proxy opinions with default values: (8) where, recall, w O C (p) is the cumulative weight (w.r.t. R p ) of the agents in C. The intuition behind (8) is to use each cycle, and not only loops (i.e., gurus), as sources of information for the proxy aggregator, by attributing to the individuals in a cycle the majority default opinion present in that cycle.
As one might intuitively expect, this is enough to break the link between delegation cycles and group abstention we identified with Proposition 2. To state the following result we need to adapt the translation function t for proxy profiles, to a translation function t ′ translating proxy profiles with default to opinion profiles with abstentions: for any i ∈ N and p ∈ P, t ′ (O i (p)) = maj(O C )(p) where C is the cycle reachable from i via R p . Proposition 3. Let A be a BA structure where γ = ⊤ (i.e., issues are independent) and fix an issue p. If each proxy profile with default is equally probable (impartial culture assumption), then the probability that a given proxy profile with default O is such that t ′ (O) is a profile in which every voter abstains tends to 0 as n tends to infinity.
Individually Rational Delegable Proxy
Delegable proxy voting can also be studied from a different perspective. Imagine a group where, for each issue p, each agent copies the binary-0 or 1-opinion of a unique trustee. 16 Imagine that this group does so repeatedly until all agents (possibly) reach a stable opinion. These new stable opinions can then be aggregated as the 'true' opinions of the individuals in the group, for instance, via majority. The collective opinion of a group of agents, who either express a binary opinion or delegate it to another agent, is (for one man-one vote proxy aggregators) the same as the output obtained from a vote where each individual has to express a binary opinion but gets there by copying the opinion of her trustee (possibly the agent itself). In this perspective, aggregation via delegable proxy can be assimilated to a (stabilizing) process of opinion formation on delegation graphs.
The above interpretation of liquid democracy is explicitly put forth in [3] . 17 Under this 'votecopying' interpretation, the constraint on individual rationality-consistency and closure of (7)-is, arguably, more easily defendable: each agent will copy opinions coming from her trustees only if consistency and closure are preserved.
Boolean DeGroot Processes
We briefly develop the above intuition, outlining an opinion diffusion model of delegable proxy which preserves individual rationality in a natural way. 18 Definition 4. • Base:
For simplicity, in this section we assume agents are therefore not allowed to abstain, although this is not a crucial assumption for the development of our analysis. 17 "While one way to describe delegations is the transfer of voting weight to another person, you can alternatively think of delegations as automated copying of the ballot of a trustee. While at assemblies with voting by a show of hands it is naturally possible to copy the vote of other people, in Liquid Democracy this becomes an intended principle" [3, p. 22] . 18 As we will consider just binary opinions (without abstentions), the concept of individual rationality can be slightly simplified: requiring an opinion to be γ-consistent suffices as in the case of binary opinions without abstentions, consistency implies closedness.
• Step: for all i ∈ N, p ∈ P,
When γ is set to ⊤, the above defines |P| independent binary processes, one for each issue p. Each of such processes is a Boolean extremal case of a DeGroot stochastic process [8] where opinions are binary, and each agent can trust one and at most one other agent. When the constraint γ is not a tautology, the definition guarantees that at each step individual opinions remain consistent with γ. We call processes defined by the above dynamics individually rational Boolean DeGroot processes (in short, BDPs). 19 
Stabilization
We say that the stream of opinion profiles O 0 , O 1 , . . . , O n , . . . stabilizes if there exists n ∈ N such that for all m ∈ N, if m ≥ n, then O m = O n . We call such profile the limit profile. A BDP that stabilizes can be thought of as an opinion transformation function [18] f G : O → O turning an initial binary profile O into a new binary profile f (O) equal to the limit profile. In this view, individually rational proxy aggregation consists first in an opinion transformation, implemented through a BDP, and then the application of an aggregator (e.g., maj) on the profile of transformed opinions f (O). A BDP that does not converge, can similarly be thought of as mapping the initial profile to a profile involving some level of abstention, where agents connected to some delegation cycle may not end up stabilizing and are therefore considered to abstain. We conclude by establishing conditions for individually rational Boolean DeGroot processes to stabilize. When γ = ⊤, the opposite direction also holds, and one can obtain a characterization of the notion of stabilization for BDPs based on properties of the initial opinion profile and of the delegation graph. 
For all p ∈ P, there is no set of agents S ⊆ N such that: S is a cycle in G p and there are two agents i, j ∈ S such that O i (p) = O j (p).
A special case of Theorem 4 is the case in which G p contains no cycle of length ≥ 2. In such case, a direct consequence of the theorem is that the process stabilizes from any profile. This is also a corollary of a known stabilization result for DeGroot processes (cf. [16, p.233] ).
Conclusions
The paper has shown how delegable proxy voting (liquid democracy) can be understood as an aggregator within the theory of binary aggregation with abstentions, for which we provided a novel characterization theorem of issue-wise majority (Theorem 1). This has allowed us to clarify the impact of cyclical delegations on individual and collective abstentions (Proposition 2) and to suggest alternative aggregators requiring individuals to reveal a default opinion, which can be shown to better behave in the presence of delegation cycles (Proposition 3). Finally we showed how delegable proxy interferes with individual rationality, a standard tenet of social choice theory. Also in this case we showed how liquid democracy could be adjusted-in the form of a stabilizing diffusion process-in order to preserve individual rationality (Theorem 3). Proof of Proposition 2. The claim amounts to computing the probability that a random proxy profile O induces a delegation graph R p that does not contain gurus (or equivalently, whose endomap r p : N → N has no fixpoints) as n tends to infinity. Now, for each agent i, the number of possible opinions on a given issue p (that is, functions O : {p} → {0, 1} ∪ N) is |(N\ {i}) ∪ {0, 1} | = n + 1 (recall i cannot express "i" as an opinion). The number of opinions in which i is delegating her vote is n − 1. So, the probability that a random opinion of i about p is an opinion delegating i's vote is n−1 n+1 . Hence the probability that a random profile consists only of delegated votes (no gurus), for a fixed issue, is ( n−1 n+1 ) n . The claimed value is then established through this series of equations:
Proofs
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The claim amounts to computing the probability that a random proxy profile with default opinions O induces a delegation graph R p (equivalently, an endomap r p : N → N) whose cycles are all hung majorities, that is, whose cycles are all even and exactly half the agents in each cycle accept p. As opinion with defaults consist of both a value x ∈ {0, 1} and a trustee i ∈ N we can treat the probability of each component as independent: the number of all possible proxy profiles with default opinions is, therefore, 2 n · n n . First of all, recall that a delegation graph can be represented as a set of trees whose roots are nodes in a cycle, that is, as trees whose roots are elements of a permutation of a subset of N. The number of ways of arranging n elements in trees rooted on m elements (with m > n ≥ 1) is given by the following recursive function (cf. [21] ):
with f (0, 0) = 1 and f (n, 0) = 0 for any n > 0. So the number n n of all possible delegation graphs equals
that is, the number of ways of arranging n elements in trees rooted on a permutation of a subset of n (recall that k! is the number of all possible permutations of k elements). Now to obtain the number of ways of arranging n elements in trees rooted on even cycles, each of which is a hung majority we adapt (10) as follows. First we establish the number of delegation graphs (for a given issue) which contain only even cycles, that is:
If each addendum of the above expression is multiplied by 2 k , that is the number of possible opinions on p of k agents, one obtains the number of possible proxy profiles with default that determine a delegation graph with only even cycles, with all the possible assignments of opinions x ∈ {0, 1} for the agents in the permutation on which the trees of the graph are rooted:
∑ k≤n and even
We can then adapt (12) by restricting the subprofiles of opinions of the k agents to hung majorities (i.e., ). We thus obtain the following value:
Under the impartial culture assumption, the probability of a proxy profile with default opinions to induce only even cycles with hung majorities is therefore (13) divided by 2 n · n n . This quantity approaches 0 as n tends to infinity.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Assume that for all p ∈ P, for all S ⊆ N such that S is a cycle in G p , for all i, j ∈ S: O i (p) = O j (p). Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N. Let k i (p) be the distance from i to the closest agent in a cycle of G p , and let k i denote max{k i (p)|p ∈ P}. We show that for any k i ∈ N, O k i i is an opinion which will not change at any later stage (stable).
• If k i = 0: i is its only infuencer, therefore O 0 i is stable by assumption.
• If k i = n + 1: Assume (IH) that for all agents j such that k j = n, O k j j is stable. This implies that all influencers of i are stable. There are two cases:
1. If {γ} ∪ p ∈ P | O R p (i) (p) = 1 ∪ ¬p ∈ P | O R p (i) (p) = 0 is not consistent, then it will never be, and therefore O n i is already stable. 
